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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNITY FOUNDATION LAW:
THE QUEST FOR ENDOWMENT BUILDING
MARK SIDEL*
In the United States, most of the attention paid to individual commu-
nity foundations is given to the larger organizations-such important play-
ers in American philanthropy as the Chicago Community Trust, the
Cleveland Foundation, and the New York Community Trust. These were
the philanthropic offspring of early twentieth century elites and the growth
in their endowments has made them wealthy and powerful institutions in
American philanthropy and social policy. For example, at the close of
2008, after significant losses, the Chicago Community Trust had an en-
dowment of $1.59 billion, the Cleveland Foundation had $1.6 billion, and
the New York Community Trust had $1.53 billion.'
This endowment growth and the historical memory of the origins of
the community foundations have helped shaped our sense of the commu-
nity foundation sector. For the relatively few Americans who have any real
idea what a community foundation is, at least until recently, the history,
size and power of these foundations and a few others meant that we thought
of community foundations are large, elite, self-perpetuating endowments
working for local communities and the common good.
But of course our modem notion of community foundations, while
still positive, should naw be considerably more nuanced. At the local level
in the United States, for the Americans who encounter a community foun-
* Professor of Law, Faculty Scholar, and Lauridsen Family Fellow, University of Iowa; Presi-
dent, International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR). Earlier versions of this article were deliv-
ered at the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) symposium on the Law of
Philanthropy in the Twenty-First Century at Chicago-Kent College of Law in October 2009, and at the
Association for Research on Nonprofit and Voluntary Organizations (ARNOVA) in November 2009.
My thanks to Putnam Barber, John Colombo, Nick Deychakiwsky, Tom Gallanis and other colleagues
for their cogent comments, to ACTEC for initiating and supporting the symposium at Chicago-Kent,
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I. CMTY. FOUND. INSIGHTS, COLUMBUS SURVEY 2008 RESULTS: GUIDEPOSTS FOR GROWTH AND
GRANTMAKING 12 (2010), http://www.cfinsights.org/home/index.php?s-filedownload&id=78. They
were not the highest, of course: The Tulsa Community Foundation had $3.8 billion in assets at the end
of 2008. Id.
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dation, they see, and may seek grants from, an entity that looks far different
from the elite institutions of the early twentieth century.
The data helps show us this. The 717 community foundations docu-
mented by the Foundation Center at the close of 2007 that now dot virtually
every comer of the United States had total endowment assets of $56.68
billion. But those endowments are very unevenly held, resulting in signifi-
cant under-capitalization in much of the American community foundation
sector. Of the 717 community foundations recognized by the IRS and the
Foundation Center in 2007, the top twenty-five of those by asset holding
held about $27.08 billion in endowment, about 47.78 percent of the $56.68
billion in community foundation assets in the United States. 2
That left 692 community foundations to share the remaining approxi-
mately 52.22 percent of the assets, or about $29.59 billion. Those 692
foundations averaged an endowment of approximately $42.76 million,
providing roughly an average of $2.13 million per year per foundation for
grant-making (assuming a five percent payout rate).3 And recall that these
are all 2007 figures. Most of these endowments fell in 2008-among a
selected group of community foundations surveyed by the Council on
Foundations, assets in that group fell by twenty-seven percent in 2008. 4
Even an average of $42.7 million in assets for the community founda-
tions below the top twenty-five in assets in some sense overstates the situa-
tion. According to the Council on Foundations, roughly 300 American
community foundations had assets under $5 million in 2007, and about 425
had endowments of $5 million and over. So the median endowment of
American community foundations likely hovers at between $5 and $10
million.
The situation is exacerbated when we consider affiliates of small local
community foundations-the smallest of the small, what might be called
"micro community foundations." Their endowments are often no higher
than $100,000-$500,000, and often they are much lower than that. Affiliate
funds and endowments are calculated as part of the "parent" community
foundation endowments for reporting purposes, and are not broken out by
the IRS or most other organizations. But in many cases they are very small,
and one could analyze them as reducing the endowment fully available to
the "parent" community foundations.
2. See Foundation Center, Key Facts on Community Foundations,
http://foundationcenter.orglgainknowledge/research/pdflkeyfacts-comm_2009.pdf (May 2009).
3. Id.
4. Foundation Center, Assets of U.S. Community Foundations Fell 27 Percent, Report Finds,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.j html?id=269100016.
(Vol 85:2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNITY FOUNDATION LAW
In many American communities, then, community foundations are not
the philanthropic heavyweights of New York, Chicago and Cleveland, but
instead small, under-funded institutions, making relatively small grants for
a very wide and diverse range of local projects. In many cases they are
unable to focus on programmatic priorities to the exclusion of other grants,
or to make larger or combined grants for major projects--diverse and im-
portant needs, cautious boards and divided community expectations prevent
that. They are sometimes perceived as the poor cousins of United Ways
that may, in precisely the same communities, raise millions of dollars a
year. They may also be perceived as the poor fundraising siblings of very
effective local schools, churches, service clubs, charities, and community
organizations, not to mention national institutions.
Several years ago, I joined the board of a small community founda-
tion. I have seen all of this firsthand-the small endowment, the pressure to
make many small grants throughout the community, the difficulty in raising
funds in competition (even if everyone shies away from that term) with
sophisticated players that range from the United Way to commercial chari-
table gift funds to a local multi-billion dollar university to high schools,
service clubs, congregations, and other long-time, sophisticated mobilizers
of resources in the community. Other than the multi-billion dollar univer-
sity, my community and my community foundation are fairly typical of
many American communities with community foundations. And my com-
munity foundation is doing reasonably well in endowment terms, at least
compared with most other community foundations in the same state of
Iowa, where ninety percent of the state's community foundations had an
average endowment size of under $4 million in 2008. 5
Given this situation, it can come as little surprise that community
foundations are sometimes seeking to use judicial and legislative processes
to build assets and endowments, and even, at times, to try to gain a com-
petitive edge over other groups seeking to mobilize community resources.
At a time when, other than the donor-advised fund portions of the Pension
Protection Act of 2006, there has been relatively little recent attention paid
to developments in community foundation law,6 this article analyzes sev-
eral focused judicial and legislative attempts by community foundations to
accelerate resource mobilization in an environment of intense competition
for individual and corporate giving.
5. See id.
6. The key work in community foundation law is CHRISTOPHER HOYT, LEGAL COMPENDIUM FOR
COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS (1996), which has set the standard in the field. All of us who have an
interest in the law affecting community foundations are indebted to Professor Hoyt for his important
work.
2010]
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I. THE STRUGGLE FOR ENDOWMENT IN THE JUDICIAL ARENA
Community foundations want to control their endowed funds, or what
they perceive to be their endowed funds. And they will fight to do so-
even, in a case I explore here, where a trust settlor used an earlier trust
model to place the funds in trusteeship at a bank, with only the income
going to the community foundation for charitable distribution. What hap-
pens when a community foundation tries to obtain from a trustee bank the
funds that a trust settlor placed in that bank, many years earlier, for invest-
ment, limiting the community foundation to distributing the income to
charitable grantees?
As community foundations moved from the trust form to the corporate
form, many banks that held and invested trust funds in which the income
was to be distributed by community foundations voluntarily turned those
funds over to their local community foundations so that the management,
investment, and charitable use of those funds could all be accomplished by
the foundation. But in at least one case, a trustee bank refused to turn over
these trust funds, arguing that the trust settlor intentionally employed a
tripartite structure in which the designated trustee bank would manage and
invest the funds, the local community foundation would select, manage and
disburse charitable funds from that endowment as investment returns were
transferred from the trustee bank to the community foundation, and the
charitable grantees would carry out programs. Should the community foun-
dation be permitted to alter that original tripartite structure and to take over
the management and investment of those funds?
That is the question that faced three levels of courts in Colorado when
the Denver Foundation, a community foundation established in 1925,
sought judicial authority to manage and hold sizable assets originally held,
managed and invested by Wells Fargo Bank. Wells Fargo was the succes-
sor bank to the original trustee bank, United Denver Bank, which had been
entrusted with the task of managing and investing a large endowment by
Charles and Dorothy Elder Sterne decades earlier. 7
At root this judicial struggle-probably the most important recent case
affecting community foundations-was waged by a bank trustee to pre-
serve the settlors' intent that the trust funds be administered by a bank trus-
tee in perpetuity, and by a community foundation for control of assets and
7. Denver Foundation v. Wells Fargo Bank, 163 P.3d 1116, 1119 (Colo. 2007); rehearing denied
by Denver Foundation v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Colo. LEXIS 700 (Colo. 2007) (mem.). The Su-
preme Court's decision reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in Denver Foundation v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 140 P.3d 78, 79-80 (Colo. App., 2005), which in turn reversed the decision of
the Denver probate court.
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endowment. This occurred in a broader environment in which community
foundations seek to build assets for work in the community, in which more
than a few community foundations may believe that they can invest those
assets most effectively, and at a time when foundation leaders are evalu-
ated, at least in part, on asset and endowment growth. 8 In turn the trustee
banks, like Wells Fargo, take their trustee responsibilities very seriously in
preserving settlors' intent. Other banks and financial institutions may also
seek to build their portfolios of charitable capital in order to cross-market
their services to individuals, corporations, and nonprofits undertaking
charitable and philanthropic work.
Thus the stage was set for the battle over the Sterne endowment. In
1976 Charles Sterne and Dorothy Elder Sterne created a charitable trust
that provided, upon their deaths, a portion of their estate "for the uses and
purposes of The Denver Foundation, a philanthropic community trust, to be
held in trust by the United Bank of Denver." The Denver Foundation was
established in 1925 to serve "charitable, educational, and benevolent
needs" in Denver by "afford[ing] an opportunity alike to persons of wealth
and persons of moderate means to make their several gifts to different trus-
tees of their own selection" while meeting "the changing needs for such
gifts with flexibility in the power of distribution." 9
The arrangement that the Sternes used in 1976 to create their trust had
been common in the United States since the founding of the Cleveland
Foundation in 1914. The Denver Foundation's 1925 Declaration of Trust
established a mechanism long known to community foundations and those
who study them. Donors, generally trust settlors, would establish funds in
trustee banks, which would in turn hold, manage and invest those funds and
disburse the annual income from that principal to the Denver Foundation.
The Foundation's role was to
distribute a portion [or all] of that income to various community 'benefi-
ciaries' identified and selected by an impartial and changing committee
knowledgeable about the charitable needs of the time. The Foundation
would then reinvest the remainder in the Foundation's endowment,
which is comprised of several component funds subject to separate ac-
counting and community recognition. 10
The situation was somewhat complicated by the wide powers that the
Foundation-like most community foundations and trusts-had under its
8. 1 note that I served as an external consultant to the attorneys for one of the parties in this
matter. See Denver Foundation, 163 P.3d at 1116. Only information available in the public judicial
record has been discussed here.




original Declaration of Trust and amendments in later years. As the Colo-
rado Supreme Court explained,
[flrom its inception as a community trust, The Denver Foundation has
enjoyed expansive powers not generally accorded to traditional benefici-
aries. For instance, The Denver Foundation's 1925 Declaration ensured
it was free to modify restrictions in trust gifts that had ceased to serve the
best interests of the Foundation's charitable beneficiaries.11 That Decla-
ration also granted the Foundation the power to direct transfers of in-
come and principal, 12 and to conclusively construe, if in good faith, any
provision contained in the Declaration.
The Sternes followed this traditional tripartite pattern for establishing
a fund with a community foundation. "Drawn to the Foundation's mission
and unique structure for charitable giving," 13 Mr. Sterne created a trust in
1976 "for the uses and purposes of The Denver Foundation," and appointed
United Bank of Denver as trustee. Three years later his wife, Dorothy Elder
Sterne, established a similar trust. According to the Court,
[t]he Sterne-Elder Trust provided that upon the Sternes' deaths, the prin-
cipal of the Trust should be held by the United Bank of Denver, and The
Denver Foundation would receive and then distribute the income from
the principal to various charities. The Sternes intended their gift as a
permanent endowment.... [T]he Steme-Elder Trust agreement provided
that '[n]either The Denver Foundation nor its Distribution Committee is
authorized to direct disbursement of principal, or invade the principal, of
such Trust.' The Steme-Elder Trust incorporated by reference the Foun-
dation's Declaration of Trust, along with any future amendments to the
Declaration. 14
In 1983, the Denver Foundation moved to the modern community
foundation structure by establishing a nonprofit corporation "capable," in
the words of the Colorado Supreme Court,
of carrying out the same functions that had theretofore been performed
by trustee banks-holding and investing trust principal as the Founda-
tion's permanent endowment.15 ... Since 1983, most settlors have cho-
11. "Article II of the 1925 Declaration allows the Foundation to deviate from an instrument
containing any gift if circumstances have so changed 'as to render unnecessary, undesirable, impractical
or impossible a literal compliance' with its terms." Id. at 1119 n.2. This is a version of the by now well-
known variance power. See Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the
Battlefor American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1145, 1155-1156 (2003).
12. The Court noted: "Article IV(4) of the 1925 Declaration provides, in part, that 'the Trustees
shall pay and disburse such portions of the net income or of the principal of the property held by them
* respectively, at such times and in such amounts as shall from time to time be ordered or directed by the
Distribution Committee....' Denver Foundation, 163 P.3d. at 1119 n.3.
13. A somewhat curious phrase for the Colorado Supreme Court to use given its eventual judg-
ment.
14. Denver Foundation, 163 P.3d at 1119-20.
15. The Court continues here: "Once the Foundation's nonprofit corporation was organized, the
corporation assumed the role of the common governing body of the Foundation, and each trust held by
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sen to make their gifts directly to the corporation, streamlining the chari-
table giving process by eliminating the middle-man trustee banks, al-
though settlors are still free to give a gift to be held in trust by a
participating trustee bank." 16
Beginning in about 1997, when the Foundation adopted an amended
and revised Declaration of Trust, it began bringing endowment funds into
the Foundation from the trustee banks. As the Court put it, "the Foundation
determined that it could better serve the charitable needs of its community
beneficiaries if it centralized management of its endowment in its nonprofit
corporation."' 17 The Foundation began asking the trustee banks to transfer
the trust principal to the Foundation for management and investment, and
most of the trustee banks--complied with most of the funds.
After the Sternes died in 2003, the Denver Foundation asked that
Wells Fargo (successor trustee to the United Bank of Denver) "transfer the
Sternes' trust principal to The Denver Foundation's nonprofit corporation
to hold for management and investment." Wells Fargo declined, "claiming
the Stemes' trust document prohibited such a transfer." A Denver probate
court granted summary judgment for the Denver Foundation, holding that a
joint reading of the Sternes' 1976 trust agreement and the amended 1997
Denver Foundation Declaration "granted the Foundation the power to di-
rect Wells Fargo to transfer the Steme-Elder Trust principal to the Founda-
tion's nonprofit corporation." The probate court gave primacy to the
Foundation's Declaration which, as construed exclusively by the Founda-
the corporation for the uses and purposes of the Foundation was to be treated by the Internal Revenue
Service as a 'component part' of the Foundation." Id. at 1120.
16. Id. The detailed mechanism as adopted in 1997 was laid out by the Court: "In 1997, The
Denver Foundation adopted an Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust ("1997 Declaration"), the
operative document governing the Foundation and its activities at present. The 1997 Declaration con-
tinues to allow for alternative plans, administered either by the corporation or by trustees of settlors'
own selection. All gifts, however, are governed by the 1997 Declaration, which contains many of the
same types of provisions as those in the 1925 Declaration. For instance, the 1997 Declaration provides,
in Article 2-3, a broad power to modify designations and restrictions on the "use or distribution of
funds." Article 3-1.1, titled "Transfer of Funds to Corporation," mandates that "[e]ach Trustee Bank
shall, within ten days after the last day of each calendar quarter, pay and disburse to the Corporation
such portion of the net income and principal of each trust held by it hereunder as the Board of Trustees
shall direct." Article 7-8.3 reiterates The Denver Foundation's power to conclusively construe the
Foundation's Declaration, and Article 7-8.5 allows the Foundation to "[a]mend any of the terms or
provisions of this Declaration.. . provided, however, that no change shall be made to this Declaration
of Trust that modifies, enlarges, or restricts the powers, duties or liabilities of any Trustee Bank."
(Footnotes omitted.) Id.
17. The Court also noted a statement by the Denver Foundation that is probably wrong: "The
Denver Foundation concluded it was and continues to be positioned advantageously to invest the prin-
cipal of the Sterne-Elder Trust because it has access to investment vehicles only available to founda-
tions or to entities capable of investing large sums." Id. at 1120 n.8.
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tion, "empowers the Foundation to compel the transfer of principal to its
nonprofit corporation."' 8
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding for Wells Fargo that
the Foundation could not direct Wells Fargo to transfer the funds to the
Denver Foundation. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Sternes created the
structure that they wished: "The Stemes' intent... was to create a perpet-
ual trust managed by a bank trustee for the benefit of the Foundation in a
standard tripartite relationship. .. ." The Foundation's Declaration of Trust
and the powers it gave the Foundation were applicable "only to funds
available to The Denver Foundation, which included the Trust's income but
not its principal." The Court of Appeals also invalidated the portion of the
Foundation's 1997 Declaration that gave the Foundation "exclusive author-
ity' to construe that Declaration, calling that "unfettered discretion" against
public policy, and it "speculated," in the words of the Supreme Court, "that
the transfer of principal to the Foundation would terminate the Trust be-
cause its legal and beneficial interests would merge."']9
The Denver Foundation appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed once again, holding that "the Sternes' intent was to establish a
perpetual gift and a permanent endowment for the uses and purposes of the
Foundation" and that "the Sternes' trust instrument does not forbid the
transfer of the trust principal to The Denver Foundation's nonprofit corpo-
ration and, indeed, that the Sternes' intent in establishing the trust would be
best effectuated by such a transfer" to the Denver Foundation for manage-
ment and investment.20
The Court gave two key reasons for its decision: first, the foundation
was entitled to conclusively construe, in good faith, any provision of its
own Declaration. Second, the Foundation's interpretation allowing for the
transfer of the trust corpus to the Foundation's nonprofit corporation corre-
sponded with the settlors' intent and essential purposes in executing the
trust agreement.
In specific terms, the Court ruled that the provision in its Declaration
that authorizes transfers of principal and income from trustee banks to the
corporation is valid, though the provision in its Declaration governing dis-
tribution of funds was made subject to restrictions contained in trust in-
struments such as the Sternes'. The result, according to the Court, is that
the transfer of the trust corpus was permitted because (1) the Foundation
was entitled to construe its Declaration (unless that interpretation was arbi-
18. Id. at 1121.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1118-19.
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trary or capricious, and the Court said it was not), including the provision
authorizing transfers of principal and income from trustee banks, and (2)
because the "Denver Foundation's interpretation, which allows for the
transfer of the Trust corpus to the Foundation's nonprofit corporation, cor-
responds with the Sternes' intent and essential purposes in executing their
1976 Trust Agreement." And, according to the Court, the Sternes agreed
that the Foundation could construe its Declaration when it incorporated the
Foundation's 1925 Declaration and later amendments into its Trust Agree-
ment.21
Did the Sternes intend to establish a trust as "a permanent gift for the
benefit of the [Denver] Foundation," as the Denver probate court held, or
did they intend to "create a perpetual charitable trust managed by a bank as
trustee" as the Court of Appeals ruled? That conflict between community
foundation models-who gets to hold, manage and invest the funds, whose
books the endowment lies on-is at the core of the case. For the majority of
the Supreme Court, the Denver Foundation was the key actor here:
the Stemes granted The Denver Foundation unique powers affording it
the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances in the realm of charita-
ble giving in perpetuity ... [including] broad powers of amendment,
modification, distribution, and construction, which evince their general
wish that The Denver Foundation exercise substantial discretion in the
administration of their gift. That the Sternes chose to entrust to The Den-
ver Foundation crucial responsibilities and a wide array of discretionary
powers not generally accorded to traditional trust beneficiaries reflects
the fact that the usual tripartite trust relationship was of significantly
less import to them than the existence of a perpetual trust administered
by the Foundation. Accordingly, we cannot read the Sternes' essential
purpose in creating the Trust to hinge on the traditional triangulated trust
form. Instead, that tripartite form was merely the mechanism by which to
achieve their essential purpose in giving the gift.22
And this judgment led clearly to the majority's holding: "In light of
this overriding purpose and the circumstances existing in 1976 that pre-
vented the Sternes from appointing The Denver Foundation to act as trus-
21. Id. at 1123.
22. Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis added). The court continued:
This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Sternes could not have designated The Den-
ver Foundation as a trustee at the time of the execution of the Trust Agreement. In 1976, The
Denver Foundation did not have a corporate entity capable of holding and administering as-
sets; thus, at that time, a transfer of principal from the Sterne-Elder Trust to The Denver
Foundation would have to have been distributed to end-user charities and the permanent en-
dowment would have been lost, in contravention of the Stemes' wishes. Now, given structural
changes permitting The Denver Foundation to hold and manage endowments, it is capable of
administering the Trust principal as trustee of this permanent endowment without violating
the Sternes' most essential purpose-that the Trust 'become part of the Denver Foundation.'
Id. at 1125.
2010]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tee, and given The Denver Foundation's power to conclusively construe its
own Declaration in good faith, we conclude that the 1976 Trust Agreement
does not restrict The Denver Foundation from directing the transfer of prin-
cipal to its nonprofit corporation to be held as part of the permanent en-
dowment of The Denver Foundation community trust." And the
Foundation was prohibited from transferring or distributing the corpus of
the Sternes' Trust to end-user charities. 23
The Court rejected Well Fargo's argument that the transfer of the trust
principal from the trustee bank to the community foundation would "merge
all legal and beneficial interests in the foundation, thereby extinguishing
the trust" because the trust agreement still named two specific beneficiaries
to which the Denver Foundation was required to distribute charitable in-
come, and the "general public" remained "an indefinite beneficiary with
enforceable rights."'24
Three Justices dissented, focusing on the settlors' intent and the
bank's role in upholding it. In their view, the Sternes set up the trust ar-
rangement they wanted and neither the Denver Foundation nor the Court
was free to change it. Justice Eid wrote that
[c]ontrary to the express terms of the 1976 Trust Agreement, the major-
ity permits The Denver Foundation to transfer the principal of the
Steme-Elder Trust to itself and thereby become trustee over the
Trust.... In my view, The Denver Foundation cannot contradict the ex-
press terms of a trust agreement, and therefore cannot, through the vehi-
cle of incorporation, give itself authority to transfer the principal of the
Sterne-Elder Trust and become trustee of the funds. Under the majority's
rationale, no provision of a trust instrument is safe from such revision by
incorporation .... 25
The dissenters pointed to several mistakes in the Court's analysis:
First,
the vast deference it pays to the Foundation's interpretation of a settlor's
trust agreement. The Foundation may have the authority to conclusively
construe its own governing documents, but it does not have such expan-
sive authority over interpretation of trust instruments under which it is
designated as one of many beneficiaries. The fact that the trust instru-
23. In a footnote, the Court notes that,
At oral argument, counsel for the Denver Foundation invited us to make explicit that our rul-
ing in no way authorizes The Denver Foundation to transfer or distribute the corpus of the
Sterne-Elder Trust to end-user charities. We accept that invitation and make clear that our
holding goes no further than to read the Trust instruments to permit transfer of the principal to
the Foundation's nonprofit corporation. We do not read the Trust instruments to permit or to
embody an intent to allow distributions of the principal to end-user charitable organizations.
Id. at 1125 n.15.
24. Id. at 1126. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to overturn the
probate court's admission of extrinsic evidence because the terms of the trust were not ambiguous.
25. Id. at 1127 (Eid, J., dissenting).
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ment in this case incorporates by reference the governing documents of
The Denver Foundation does not change this result.... The Foundation
cannot give itself powers under the 1997 Declaration that, by incorora-
tion, would contradict the plain terms of the 1976 Trust Agreement.
And the dissenters find that the Court has done exactly that: in the dis-
senters' view, the Stemes' Trust Agreement prohibited the Foundation
from "disbursing" the principal of the Trust under the provision of the 1997
Declaration which gave the Foundation "the power to direct a trustee bank
to 'disburse' the principal of a trust to the Foundation. '27 Thus, the dissent
argued, the principal has been "disbursed" by the Court in violation of the
Trust Agreement.
[T]he 1976 Trust Agreement governs this case. The Denver Foundation
is not free to abide by it in some instances and not in others.... [T]he
question here is not one of The Denver Foundation's good faith; rather, it
is whether the Foundation can override the language of the 1976 Trust
Agreement by amending its governing documents incorporated into that
Agreement. In my view, The Denver Foundation does not have the au-
thority to revise a trust document's provisions through incorporation. 28
But that "disbursal" argument is probably overdrawn, as even the dis-
senters recognize. If it is-"if the Foundation is correct that the prohibition
on disbursement of principal applies only to disbursements made to end-
user charities" 29-then in the view of the dissenters
there is a more fundamental problem in its interpretation. By permitting
The Denver Foundation to disburse the trust principal to itself 'to hold
for management and investment,' ... the Foundation becomes the new
trustee of the Steme-Elder Trust. This arrangement is clearly contrary to
the language of the 1976 Trust Agreement, which names the United
Bank of Denver (and Wells Fargo as its successor) as trustee .... 30
For the dissenters, the majority's notion of the trustee bank as "merely
the mechanism" for the Sternes' "most essential purpose" of "establishing a
permanent endowment" for the Denver Foundation is "problematic." The
Sternes chose that mechanism, and "there is no indication from the 1976
Trust Agreement that the Sternes did not care whether Wells Fargo served
as the trustee. ' 31 On the contrary, their trust agreement "demonstrate[s] that
the Sternes carefully and thoughtfully considered the issue of which entity
would serve as the trustee of their Trust." 32
26. Id. at 1127-28 (Eid, J., dissenting).
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The majority says that the Sternes could not have named the Denver
Foundation as trustee in 1976 because the Foundation's structure did not
allow it, and that is why they chose the tradition tripartite structure that it
did. "But," notes the dissent, "the Foundation obtained the power to act as a
trustee in 1983, and there was nothing preventing the Sternes from select-
ing the Foundation to serve as trustee after that time." 33 And the Founda-
tion still recognizes the tripartite trust form and allows donors to make a
gift to the Foundation held in trust by a trustee bank. "That The [sic] Den-
ver Foundation continues to permit such a choice demonstrates the fact that
the selection of a trustee is an important one."'34
The dissenters clearly choose the specific, structural decisions that the
trust settlers made over a current-day court's view of the trust's purposes.
Or, as they put it somewhat more mildly, "[i]n the end, the majority's ra-
tionale demonstrates the dangers of elevating a trust's purpose over its
language." 35
Discussion
Why do we care who holds, manages and invests this endowment?
Beyond ultimately unproductive arguments over which of two very sophis-
ticated organizations-the Denver Foundation and Wells Fargo Bank-
might provide better investment returns, at the end of the day it probably
does not make too much different to the ultimate charitable grantees and to
doing good community work whether the management and investment of
this endowment rests with the Foundation or with the bank. At the end of
the day, the Denver Foundation-a highly regarded community foundation
with a long record of effective service in Denver-will determine the chari-
table grantees for the investment returns from the Sterne endowment.
But which organization manages and invests this endowment appeared
to make a significant difference to the Foundation and the bank-worth a
multi-year judicial battle. In general terms-not necessarily in this dis-
pute36-a community foundation might wish to show significant and grow-
ing endowment funds and their effective management and investment as
well as distribution, and a bank would hold strongly to the need to hew to
settlors' intent and might also wish to show charitable funds under man-
agement and market its services to other charities. For a community foun-
dation, autonomy might be important-it might wish to handle all
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1129.
35. Id.
36. 1 want to re-emphasize that I do not know and make no inferences as to the motivations of the
parties in the Denver Foundation/Wells Fargo case whatsoever.
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endowments internally, and make decisions internally, rather than going
back to a trustee bank on investment and management issues. For a trustee
bank, and certainly for Wells Fargo in this case, the expressed intent of the
trust settlors was crucially important.
In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court had to decide what the pri-
mary objective of the donors was and how that could be reconciled with the
modern role of community foundations and trustee banks. Was the primary
objective to benefit the community foundation and its charitable grantees
by turning over investment and management of a very sizable endowment
to the foundation, or was it to combine the donors' charitable intent with
the structural choices donors made in an earlier era by maintaining man-
agement and investment of the funds in a trustee bank? The community
foundation won that judicial battle for control over the management and
investment of an endowment.
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR ENDOWMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA
In Denver Foundation v. Wells Fargo, the Denver Foundation sought
to use the courts to build their endowment and extend control over endow-
ments held by trustee banks, and Wells Fargo sought to uphold the trust
settlors' intent and to retain control over the management and investment of
those funds. Community foundations have also used legislative means to
seek to increase endowments at a time of strong competition for endow-
ment and other gifts. Here I outline several of those strategies that have
resulted in statutory support for community foundation endowment-
building at the state level. As the economic situation improves, we are
likely to see more attempts to use state legislatures as endowment-building
forces for community foundations.
A. Preferencing Community Foundations Through Tax Credits for Com-
munity Foundation Endowment Building
Several states have adopted (and in some cases sunsetted) legislation
that preferences community foundation endowment-building through state
tax credits. These programs began to accelerate in the 1990s, an era of wel-
fare reform and devolution of government services from federal to state and
from state to charities. By the end of the 1990s approximately twenty states
provided various kinds of tax credits to support various kinds of charities in
a series of initiatives, sometimes called "compassion tax credits," that were
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strongly supported by religious and conservative groups. 37 One of those
states-Michigan-focused the credits initially on community founda-
tions.38
Michigan. Between 1989 and 1997, Michigan's state legislature pro-
vided an annual tax credit of fifty percent of the amount a Michigan tax-
payer contributed during the tax year to the endowment fund of a certified
community foundation, up to a maximum credit or $100 for individuals,
$200 for joint filers, and, for a resident estate or trust, ten percent of the tax
liability for the tax year (prior to any personal income tax credits), or
$5,000. 3 9
Initial research on the impact of the Michigan program conducted in
1999 showed that
the size and number of individual and business donations to community
foundations were positively influenced by the tax credit, implying that
the tax credit was successful in achieving the goal of encouraging giving
to these charitable organizations.... The law had a positive and signifi-
cant effect on the total dollar amount of giving to the sample community
foundations and on the total number of contributors for both individuals
and businesses. The results show that the tax credit increased individual
donations an average of $27,393.18 per foundation and business dona-
tions an average of $45,396.37 per foundation.40
Iowa. Iowa currently has the most extensive tax credit program in-
volving gifts to community foundations, along with an extensive gambling
revenue sharing program discussed separately below. The Endow Iowa
Program provides a twenty percent tax credit for gifts by individuals, busi-
nesses, or financial institutions to permanently endowed funds within quali-
fied community foundations or affiliates, 41 in addition to regular charitable
income tax deductions. 42 Annual tax credits are limited to $2 million.
Within the state, the tax credit program is regularly cited by community
foundations seeking donors and is credited as a major force in rising dona-
tions to community foundation endowments.
37. See, e.g., ACTON CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE COMPASSION, STATE COMPASSION TAX CREDITS I-
14 (2004), http://www.samaritanguide.com/pdf/StateTax-Creditsresearch.pdf.
38. BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, THE NEXT STEP TOWARD WELFARE REFORM: A MANUAL FOR
ENACTING TAX CREDITS FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (1998),
http://www.beaconhill.org/BHlStudies/NextStepWR/nscurrentl.html.
39. For a summary of the Michigan program, see id.
40. Donna M. Anderson & Ruth Beier, The Effect of a State Tax Credit on Giving to Community
Foundations, 43 AM. ECONOMIST 66, 66,69 (1999).
41. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 261-47.1, 261-47.3(2) (2010); see also Iowa Community Foundations,
Endow Iowa Tax Credits, http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/page10753.cfin (last visited Mar.
3,2010).
42. Iowa Community Foundations, Endow Iowa Tax Credits,
http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/page10753.cfin (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
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Beyond the state legislative preferencing of community foundations
through tax credits, the process by which community foundations are
"qualified" for the program is also interesting, for it relies on the national
self-regulatory and certification program for community foundations built
by the Council on Foundations. This is almost certainly an extended use of
the certification program that the Council neither expected nor intended,
but they cannot oppose yet another indication of the somewhat surprising
strength of that self-regulatory initiative. In order to participate in either the
tax credit program or the gambling revenue program discussed below, an
Iowa community foundation must either be "qualified" or affiliated with
one that is-a requirement that has also helped to spur the development of
what I call "micro community foundations," and I do not mean that term
entirely positively.
Qualification means that the community foundation must serve a
county-wide area, and must either be "confirmed [to be] in compliance
with [the] National Standards for U.S. Community Foundations or has been
designated as an Endow Iowa Qualified Community Foundation for pur-
poses of the Endow Iowa Tax Credit through a collaborative determination
by the Iowa Council of Foundations and the Iowa Department of Economic
Development." 43
As of late 2009, as a result of intense pressures on state revenue, the
tax credit program for community foundation endowment-building was
under threat in Iowa.
Montana. Since 1997, Montana has offered an endowment tax credit
for donors who make a qualifying planned gift to a qualified Montana
charitable endowment (a definition considerably broader than community
foundation). The history is interesting, for it points out some of the con-
flicts involved with developing tax credits for various forms of community
philanthropy.
In the early 1990s, after support from the Ford Foundation's rural phi-
lanthropy initiative, Montana's governor created a Task Force on Endowed
Philanthropy, which he charged with examining the nitty-gritty details of
what the state could and should do to promote endowed philanthropy.
The task force's first major effort was to help draft and lobby for a bill
for a tax credit for direct gifts to endowments with community founda-
tions. The bill was presented to the 1995 legislature.... Although pat-
terned after a similar tax credit in Michigan, and bolstered by the
testimony and support of Russell Mawby of the W.K. Kellogg Founda-
tion of Battle Creek and Dorothy Johnson of the Michigan Council on
43. Iowa Community Foundations, Qualified Foundations,
http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/page 10756.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
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Foundations, the legislature rejected the first bill for a variety of reasons.
One of those reasons was that other types of nonprofits felt it gave com-
munity foundations an unfair advantage. Others felt the incentive would
diminish giving to annual campaigns.
The task force's work continued. After two more years, [in which the
Montana Community Foundation] and partners from other Montana
foundations, bankers and financial advisors revised and refined the legis-
lation, a successful bill was passed in the 1997 legislature. It provides for
a state tax credit in the amount of [fifty] percent of qualifying contribu-
tions, up to a maximum $10,000 credit per year for individuals for cer-
tain planned gifts to permanent charitable endowments (not limited to
community foundation endowments) and a credit of equal size for gifts
from an estate or corporation....
After the legislation passed, Gov. Racicot helped get the word out by en-
couraging donors to take advantage of the credit by year's end in a tele-
vised public service announcement. Although the tax credit was only
nine months old when 1997 ended, we saw a significant increase in giv-
ing to permanent endowments across the state in that short time .... 44
The credit is forty percent of a planned gift made by an individual, and
twenty percent of an outright gift made by a qualified business, both with a
limit of $10,000 in credits per year.4 5 In 2007, the credit was extended by
the state legislature and signed into law by the governor to run until 2013,
maintaining the current levels of tax credits but revising the definition of a
"'permanent, irrevocable fund' to exclude contributions that are 'expended
directly for constructing, renovating, or purchasing operational assets, such
as buildings or equipment.' 46
In Montana, reviews of the impact of the credit program on endow-
ments continue to be very positive. The Montana Community Foundation
noted in 2007 that
[elstimates by the Department of Revenue tell us that between $100 and
$130 million in permanently endowed funds have qualified for the tax
credit. Here at the Foundation, we can attribute nearly $9 million in do-
nations that qualified for the tax credit. 'This is an important tool that
nonprofits all over Montana are using to build sustainability,' said Linda
Reed, president of the Foundation. 'We'll be using it aggressively over
the next six years.' 4 7
44. Sidney Armstrong, Letter from Montana: Here's to Bigger Endowments in the Big Sky State,
FOUNDATION NEWS AND COMMENTARY, Sept.-Oct. 1998, http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/arti-
cle.cfn?ID=1052.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-30-2328, 15-31-161 (2009).
46. BIG SKY INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NONPROFITS, 2008 GUIDE TO SUPPORTING
MONTANA'S LOCAL AND COUNTY COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 3 (2008),
http://www.bigskyinstitute.org/pdf/O8_MTLCFGuide%20-%2ORev%201 .pdf.
47. The Montana Community Foundation, Great News!: Qualified Endowment Tax Credit Ex-
tended by Legislature, INFINITY: THE MONTANA COMMUNITY FOUNDATION NEWSLETrER, Mar. 2007,
at 4, http://www.mtcf.org/pdfs/MCF-NL-Mar07.pdf.
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Nebraska. The Nebraska legislature established a tax credit program
for gifts to qualified permanent endowments in nonprofit organizations
(including but not limited to community foundations) 48 in 2006 to encour-
age local community giving, to take advantage of the generational transi-
tion already taking place in Nebraska and to avoid "los[s] to federal estate
taxes or to heirs residing outside the state." By July 2009 about $6.5 mil-
lion in qualifying gifts to nonprofits had been made under the tax credit
scheme. 49
"A study conducted by the Nebraska Community Foundation in 2001
shows an estimated $258 billion, or $5.2 billion annually, will be trans-
ferred from one generation to the next by the middle of this century," noted
the Nebraska newspaper Prairie Fire. But "[i]n rural Nebraska, twenty-four
counties are already experiencing the peak years of transfer, because of
aging populations and out-migration of young people. For rural Nebraska,
the peak transfer is expected to occur around the year 2015." 50
The Nebraska charitable tax credit is modeled after similar legislation
in Montana, which is touted by a Nebraska newspaper as having "resulted
in an additional $74 million for that state's endowments in just five years."
The Nebraska program, initially in effect from 2006 to 2009, permitted a
maximum annual credit of $5,000 for individuals who make irrevocable
planned gifts to Nebraska community foundations, and to Nebraska-taxed
corporations that make outright gifts. 51
The Nebraska program appears to have had strong local support. The
largest newspaper in the state, the Omaha World-Herald, editorialized in
2007 that
[t]his type of practical approach to community endowments is crucial to
the future of rural Nebraska. Ultimately, the destiny of rural communities
will depend primarily on their own efforts, vision and solidarity. An in-
dispensable tool in that effort will be public-spirited pledging that keeps
a vital portion of rural income in the communities that need it most .... 5 2
48. The statute defines "qualified endowment" as follows:
[Q]ualified endowment means a permanent, irrevocable fund that is used for Nebraska chari-
table purposes and held by a Nebraska incorporated or established organization that: (])(a) Is
a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended; or (b) Is a bank or trust company that is holding the fund on behalf of a tax-exempt
organization; and (2) Holds the fund as a permanent endowment fund.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-27,229 (2006).
49. Raising Spirits, Raising Money, LB 405 UNICAMERAL UPDATE (AFP Nebraska, Lincoln, NE),
July 2009, at 7, available at www.afpnebraska.org/newsletter/pdf/Newsletter/20July/202009.doc.
50. Maxine Moul, The Nebraska Charitable Tax Credit and Community Endowments, PRAIRIE
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Now is the time for Nebraskans to spread that word," the editorial
said.53 In 2008, an attempt was made to increase the credit to $10,000,
increase the cap on credits to $5 million per year, and extend the program
to 2016. That bill did not pass in 2008. 54
Despite that support, the tax credit in Nebraska sunsetted, at least tem-
porarily, in 2009 because the state legislature has failed to renew it. En-
dowNebraska, the organization administering and promoting the program,
notes that "[t]his has been a particularly difficult [legislative] session be-
cause of the economic recession and the pressure on the state's budget" but
also notes strong support for the credit and promised a strong effort to re-
new it in 2010. 55
North Dakota. North Dakota approved tax credits for individual and
corporate gifts to community foundation endowments in 2007. Individuals
who make a qualified endowment 56 to the North Dakota Community Foun-
dation or one of its component funds receive a tax credit of forty-percent of
the allowable charitable deduction up to a maximum of $10,000 per year
per taxpayer or $20,000 per year for each couple filing jointly. The credit
may be carried forward for three additional years. North Dakota tax-paying
C corporations, S corporations, estates, limited liability companies, and
trusts receive a forty-percent credit up to $10,000 for gifts to the qualified
endowment fund of the North Dakota Community Foundation or one of its
component funds.
The North Dakota Community Foundation calls these "incredible in-
centives on top of the already great charitable income tax deductions and
really offer a great benefit for gifts to the North Dakota Community Foun-
dation and its component funds."'57
Louisiana. Louisiana is an example of a state where such a state tax
credit program has not yet passed, despite strenuous efforts. In 2007 several
state legislative bills proposed a tax credit to permanent endowments at
community foundations. They would have provided a credit for qualified
gifts to qualified community foundations made by individuals, corpora-
tions, other business entities, or resident estates or trusts, with the credit
53. Id.
54. Howard K. Marcus, Tax Credit's Full Effect Still Years Away, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb.
3, 2008, at 8.
55. AFP Nebraska, The Nebraska Charitable Tax Credit Update, available at
http://www.afpnebraska.org/ (May 29, 2009).
56. S.B. 2363, 60th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007) (enacted), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/60-2007/bill-text/HBCGO60O.pdf.
57. North Dakota Community Foundation, North Dakota's Tax Credit for Gifts to North Dakota
Community Foundation Funds, http://www.ndcf.net/Information/NDtaxCredit.asp (last visited Mar. 3,
2010).
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limited to $5,000, or $10,000 for a joint return. In order to qualify, commu-
nity foundations would have to be established before April 1, 2007 or, if
established after that date, "operate and serve in a parish of this state which
is not served by such a community foundation or it must operate as a geo-
graphic component of a community foundation provided for [above]" 58-a
clear attempt to prevent competition with existing community foundations
and the establishment of new, competing groups to receive these credits.
In addition, the bills would have required that the community founda-
tion be incorporated or established as a permanent endowment (Senate Bill
141),59 or that a majority of its funds be established and operated as perma-
nent endowments, at least six months before the beginning of the tax year
for which the credit is claimed (Senate Bill 167).60 The bills set different
minimum levels for existing endowment: $25,000 for one, and $250,000
for the other. Qualified foundations would not have been allowed to serve
only one nonprofit, and would have been required to make grants to unre-
lated nonprofits and charities. The bill mandating the $25,000 endowment
minimum also required that the foundation "build a permanently endowed
value" of $100,000 within eighteen months of establishment and "main-
tain[] an ongoing program in order to attract new endowment funds by
seeking gifts and bequests from a wide range of potential donors in the
community or area served."'61
Both of the 2007 proposals died in committee, and Louisiana legisla-
tive officials consider it unlikely that a tax credit scheme for community
foundations would be enacted in the current environment that includes a
"billion dollar deficit right now.. . ." That is likely to be the short-term
response from other states as well. 62
B. The Prospects for State Legislative Preferencing for Community Foun-
dations Through State Tax Credits and Other Incentives
In the short term, the prospects for a rapid expansion of community
foundations' attempts to use state legislatures as endowment-building de-
58. S.B. 141, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007) (enacted), available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=425827
59. S.B. 141, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007) (enacted), available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=425827.
60. S.B. 167, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007) (enacted), available at
http://www.legis.state.1a.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=425908.
61. S.B. 141, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007) (enacted), available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=425827.
62. Interview by Laura Johnson, research assistant to Mark Sidel, with Riley Boudreaux, Louisi-
ana State Legislature Chief Revenue Counsel (Oct. 15, 2009).
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vices through state tax credits cannot be optimistic. The threats to the tax
credit program in Iowa, the sunsetting of the successful state tax credit
program for community foundations in Nebraska, and the failure to adopt a
tax credit program in Louisiana all illustrate those obstacles ahead. But in
the longer term, state tax credits for community foundation endowment-
building are clearly on the agenda, and calls for state legislatures to enact
them can be expected to multiply as the recession eases.
III. THE NEXT FRONTIER?: COMMUNITY FOUNDATION ENDOWMENT
BUILDING THROUGH STATE LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION OF STATE
GAMBLING REVENUE
Beyond state tax credits, other attempts have been made to persuade
state legislatures to become endowment building partners for community
foundations. One newer method is to persuade state legislatures to appro-
priate state gambling revenues for local development through endowment-
building at local community foundations-and, at the same time, to secure
the political base for casino gambling at the state level.
This process may have had its start in Iowa. In Iowa, the County En-
dowment Fund Program, established by statute in 2004, provides one half
of one percent of the state's revenues from gambling to counties without a
state gaming license. Fourteen of Iowa's ninety-nine counties have a state-
licensed gaming facility (casino) in those counties and they receive funds
directly from gaming revenue for charitable, educational and other pur-
poses; this County Endowment Fund Program serves the other eighty-five
counties as a means to spread gambling revenues around the state, promote
local economic development and charitable activities, and secure the base
for gambling throughout the state through payments to all counties
throughout that state.
For our purposes the most interesting feature of the Iowa program is
that community foundations and their affiliates at the county level are the
statutory designees to receive and program these funds. The County En-
dowment Fund Program is administered by the Iowa Department of Eco-
nomic Development, working closely with the Iowa Council of
Foundations. By statute the recipient foundations re-grant seventy-five
percent of program funds received to charitable projects within their coun-
ties and are required to direct the other twenty-five percent to a "permanent
endowment fund [such as a community foundation or affiliate], which is
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intended to attract other donations and provide a source of permanent fund-
ing for charitable projects within the county. '63
In 2005, more than $5.4 million was distributed to eighty-five com-
munity foundations and affiliates around Iowa, with each organization re-
ceiving about $63,000 in the initial year of the County Endowment Fund
Program. In 2006, more than $5.7 million was distributed, also to eighty-
five community foundations and affiliates, averaging $67,000. In 2007,
$6.6 million was distributed to the eighty-five community foundations and
affiliates, averaging $70,000, and in 2008, $11.5 million was distributed,
averaging $131,000 per foundation or affiliate. In 2009, another $11 mil-
lion was distributed to eighty-five community foundations and affiliates.64
In Iowa, community foundations at the county level-in some cases estab-
lished largely to receive and program these funds-are rapidly becoming
dependent on such a program, making it politically difficult for a state leg-
islature to end the subsidy, and bolstering casino gambling throughout the
state.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON LEGISLATIVE PREFERENCING FOR COMMUNITY
FOUNDATION ENDOWMENTS, AND USING THE COURTS TO BUILD
ENDOWMENTS
At the very least, hopefully I have established that community founda-
tions are actively seeking to use judicial and legislative means to bolster
their endowment-building activities at a time of intense competition with
sophisticated players that range from the United Way to the Fidelity Chari-
table Gift Fund to universities, high schools, service clubs, congregations,
and other long-time, skilled mobilizers of resources in the community.
Some may have doubts about this process, but, at least on the uses of
state legislatures to build community foundation endowments, I do not.
From where I sit, community foundations are often the weaker players in
the charitable resource mobilizing community. They are directly based in
and directly serving communities but they are often many steps behind and
many dollars short in a highly sophisticated, even brutal, fundraising envi-
63. Iowa Community Foundations, County Endowment Fund,
http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/page 0758.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
64. See IOWA COUNCIL OF FOUNDATIONS, 2009 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR
ON ENDOW IOWA AND COUNTY ENDOWMENT FUND, available at
http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/page 10758.cfm; BUILDING IOWA'S COMMUNTIES
THROUGH PHILANTHROPY: A SNAPSHOT OF THE 2008-2009 COUNTY ENDOWMENT FUND PROGRAM
4-5, http://www.iowacommunityfoundations.org/pageI0758.cfm; Governor Culver Announces $6.6
Million for Community Foundations, http://www.iowacounciloffoundations.org/endow.htm (Sept. 11,
2007); Newsline, Communities Pursue Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Funds,
http://www.areal 5rpc.com/PDF/newsletters/DEC%202005.pdf (Oct. 2009).
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ronment. If they try to use state legislatures to catch up through tax credits
and gambling revenue, why not?
One "why not" could focus on state gambling policy rather than com-
munity foundation law. The gambling industry's support for the use of state
gambling revenues to spread endowment and program funds throughout the
state (to the eighty-five counties where there are no casinos in addition to
the fourteen counties where there are) can be seen as an attempt to secure
its political base well beyond the communities where it already provides
some additional revenue and some additional jobs.65 In exchange, it ap-
pears, the gambling industry gives up little if anything. I am not aware, for
example, that state taxes on the gambling industry were increased to fund
the community foundation program.
And what should we think about the uses of a state court system to
battle over an endowment when there is perhaps virtually no significant
difference in either the investment return depending on whether the com-
munity foundation or the trustee bank controls the management and in-
vestment of the funds? And when, no matter how the Colorado Supreme
Court decided, the income from that fund would be either turned over to
the Denver Foundation by Wells Fargo, or directly programmed by the
Foundation, for charitable grants in the community, meaning that there
should be no demonstrable negative effect on community benefit? If the
true goal here was purely institutional, to claim or to retain endowment,
and the trust law questions are reasonably evenly divided, one certainly
feels some sympathy for the predicament of the Colorado Supreme Court.
On the legislative initiatives preferencing community foundations,
numerous queries can be raised. Why is it a good idea necessarily to in-
crease endowments, as Henry Hansmann and others have asked? Does the
focus on increasing endowment for community foundations in the states,
and their own focus on increasing endowments, have the effect of reducing
startup capital or ongoing donations for charities? For those state programs
that preference community foundations over other vehicles, why should we
preference community foundations over, for example, operational charities
(the kinds of organizations that community foundations support)? 66 Why
are we preferencing gifts to community foundations rather than, in effect,
providing all individual givers with these incentives and thus devolving
decision making to individuals? 67 States will need to address these and
65. How much revenue and what kind of jobs? See generally BETH PEARSON & PETER S. FISHER,
IOWA FISCAL PARTNERSHIP, CITY REVENUE AND SMART GROWTH, 14 (2008),
http://www.iowafiscal.org/2008docs/081113-cityrevs.pdf.
66. 1 am grateful to John Colombo for raising these questions at the Chicago-Kent symposium.
67. Thanks to Tom Gallanis for raising this particular question at the Chicago-Kent symposium.
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other questions in the years ahead, as momentum builds for more legisla-
tive initiatives to strengthen community foundation endowment building.
V. BEYOND STATE LEGISLATURES AND COURTS: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE
LAW FRAMEWORKS IN COMuMNITY FOUNDATION REGULATION AND
ENDOWMENT BUILDING
Finally, in our focus on the use of state legislatures and of the courts
by community foundations to build endowments, we should not ignore
other private law aspects of the development of community foundation law
(or law-like instruments), and their role in building endowments.
Here I mention only briefly the use of self-regulatory standards by
community foundations to establish community norms for the community
foundation sector in the United States. Within the American philanthropic
sector, self-regulation has, for the most part, failed to gain momentum,
especially when it comes to private and corporate foundations. The only
real bright spot for the proponents of self-regulation in the American phil-
anthropic arena is the community foundation sector, and specifically the
National Standards for Community Foundations supported and spread by
the Council on Foundations.
American philanthropy has long displayed contradictory reactions to
self-regulation. The private foundation component of American giving-
independent foundations in an independent sector-did not even begin to
embrace self-regulation until forced to do so by scandals in the for-profit
and non-profit worlds. The private foundation sector continues to regard
self-regulation with at least deep ambivalence and in some cases direct
resistance, particularly when self-regulation moves from easy principles to
hard implementation, and despite individual cases (like the Getty Trust) in
which private foundation self-regulation must essentially be used to change
foundation behavior and force the removal of key offending officials. 68
In a different context, a form of self-regulation imposed by govem-
ment in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks-the federal gov-
ernment's multiple attempts to draw up or rework "voluntary guidelines"
on overseas activities from American philanthropic organizations-have
elicited a truculent response along with active, self-defensive implementa-
tion from the philanthropic community after it became clear that the gov-
68. For an earlier approach to these issues, see, for example, Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding
Themselves: Nonprofit Self-Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 834-
835 (2005).
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ernment might move beyond the targeting of Muslim philanthropic organi-
zations into the broader philanthropic sector.69
In yet a third context for philanthropic self-regulation-national stan-
dards for the specific sub-sector that comprises over 700 community foun-
dations-both the acceptance and implementation of those self-regulatory
standards have been much smoother than the response to self-regulation for
private foundations or for institutions giving abroad. This section discusses
briefly the impact of self-regulation in the community foundation context
and its relationship to endowment building.
While self-regulation has not proceeded far with private and corporate
foundations, community foundations are a somewhat different story. The
Council on Foundations adopted and promulgated the National Standards
for Community Foundations in 200070 intending that they develop into an
effective example of detailed and specific self-regulatory norms and im-
plementation. Of the more than 700 community foundations now active in
the United States, 456 have self-confirmed their compliance with the Stan-
dards and 70 more are working on the compliance process. 71
Why would they adopt a form of self-regulation-albeit a rather loose
form-so readily, particularly when their private and corporate foundation
cousins are arguably resisting it with much of their might? The Community
Foundations National Standards Board (an affiliate of the Council on
Foundations) explains:
In the United States, community foundations serve tens of thousands of
donors, administer more than $40 billion in charitable funds, and address
the core concerns of more than 700 communities and regions. With such
a presence-nationally and within local communities--comes responsi-
bility. National Standards for U.S. Community Foundations mark an in-
dividual and collective commitment and an outward sign that community
foundations take this responsibility very seriously. 72
But more particularly, the existence of standards and compliance with
them also helps raise money and build endowment:
69. See MARK SIDEL, REGULATION OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN AN
ERA OF UNCERTAINTY (2010); Mark Sidel, Counter-Terrorism and the Enabling Legal and Political
Environment for Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of "War on Terror" States, 10 INT'L J. OF NOT-
FOR-PROFIT L. 7, 13-14 (2008), http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol I Oiss3/special_2.htm;-MARK
SIDEL, MORE SECURE, LESS FREE? ANTITERRORISM POLICY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER
11 (rev. paper ed. 2007).
70. Council on Foundations, Community Foundations Home,
http://bestpractices.cof.org/community/ (2010).
71. Community Foundations National Standards Board, About National Standards,
http://www.cfstandards.org/About_us/aboutus.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
72. Community Foundations National Standards Board, Why National Standards,
http://www.cfstandards.org/About-us/why-ns.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
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In response to a challenged global economy, expensive corporate bail-
outs, and several high-profile financial misdeeds and mistakes, Ameri-
cans are more concerned than ever about where to put their money-this
extends to their charitable investments. The dollars they set aside for
charity are limited and precious. The institutions they choose to support
must be credible and trustworthy. As a symbol of excellence and rigor,
the National Standards Seal helps cautious philanthropists recognize and
choose community foundations as a sound place to give and make a dif-
ference. 73
That relationship between self-regulation and endowment-building ef-
forts goes beyond individual foundation adherence to the National Stan-
dards:
Community foundations use National Standards to distinguish them-
selves from a variety of competitors that offer traditional community
foundation services, such as donor advised funds, in a marketplace that is
both local and national. As a field, community foundations engage in
collective marketing, pooling resources and co-branding themselves to
build awareness of the field for individual community foundation bene-
fit. National Standards reduce the risk of joint marketing by ensuring all
participants have met benchmarks for quality in operations and service. 74
Despite its recent origins-for the National Standards were issued
only in 2000-the community foundations' standards process is arguably
the most successful self-regulatory effort yet undertaken in the American
philanthropic arena. Its relative success may be due to its application to a
coherent, well-defined and very well-bounded sector of the philanthropic
community, a relatively high degree of agreement within that community
foundation sector on the importance of standards and self-regulation in a
rapidly growing field, an emphasis on education, strengthening account-
ability, good faith intention, confirmation, and peer review rather than
sanctions, strong support from the Council on Foundations (the national
umbrella body in the philanthropic arena), and lack of competition from
other self-regulatory models, among other factors.
But the National Standards are also important because community
foundations believe that they will help build assets and endowment by aid-
ing community foundations in being perceived as high-quality, vetted, and
as certified members of the American community of community founda-
tions. In all these senses-including their utility in building endowment-
the broad private law established by the National Standards for Community
Foundations has become part of the less formal law of community philan-
thropy in the United States, in part as an endowment building and a com-
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law, self-regulatory tools in the foundation or broader nonprofit commu-
nity.
